International agreements, international cooperation, treaties, flexibility mechanisms, exit clauses, derogation clauses The form and content of international agreements are closely linked. This idea, recently formulated by scholars at the intersection of international law (IL) and international relations (IR) (Guzman 2005; Hathaway, 2005; Raustiala 2005) has important implications for the study of legalized intergovernmental cooperation. The relationship between form and substance affects issues of paramount importance to the international legal system, including the drafting of contracts, the choice between binding and soft law, the delegation of powers to international organizations and tribunals and compliance with treaties. The form-substance equation, in turn, is shaped by the many uncertainties that permeate international affairs, including insufficient information about future events, preferences of other states, and changes in domestic politics (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). This chapter is a contribution to the forthcoming anthology INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TAKING STOCK (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., Cambridge University Press 2012). This chapter provides an overview of the flexibility mechanisms provided for in international agreements and the role of these mechanisms in promoting or hindering international cooperation. Part I discusses the many flexibilities available to contractors. It divides these instruments into two broad categories: formal mechanisms (such as reservations, opt-out clauses and opt-out provisions) and informal practices (such as self-interpretation, non-participation and non-compliance).

The second part deals with research on international law and international relations on the design and use of treaty flexibility mechanisms, with a focus on studies on exclusion and safeguard clauses. Part III highlights several conclusions that emerge from the flourishing literature on contract flexibility and suggests future lines of research. Traditional law choice theory understands certainty and flexibility as opposing values: increase one and you inevitably decrease the other. This article challenges received wisdom by reinventing distinction. Instead of taking care of certainty or flexibility for themselves, this suggests that we take care of them because everyone facilitates the promotion of a certain set of values. And while there may be a necessary trade-off between security and flexibility, there is no necessary trade-off between value groups. There is scope for improving a choice of law system in relation to both. The article shows how this has happened in the history of choice of law and how it can be achieved in the future. Mr. W.

WATKIN DAVIES, in an article on “Justice in International Affairs”, published in Hibbert Journal, 31, No. 4 argues that justice in the international sphere, based on treaties and conventions, is not appropriate, and that the mechanism that applies it is likely to become the most abhorrent tyranny unless supplemented by something else. In a world where change takes place at different times in different countries, it is folly on the part of statesmen to reach peace agreements that declare them definitive without ensuring the future prevention of political and economic grievances. Developments are leading to legitimate national aspirations. Dr. Davies provides examples from the past and contemporary history to show how population changes make geographic boundaries unsatisfactory. Remedial measures other than the acquisition of new land, such as increasing the efficiency of production or colonization, are currently of little use due to prevailing economic nationalism. There remains a way out: that sooner or later nations take their destiny into their own hands and break the law by resorting to war. If economic and political hostilities are to be avoided, flexibility must be introduced into our international system. An institution must be created — it already exists in a very crude form in the League of Nations — whose task will be to revise treaties from time to time and adjust national boundaries, to redistribute economic resources, to regulate migration in the interests of the whole world and, in general, to reconsider any reasonable national aspiration.

The way forward is set out in article XIX of the Covenant. The link between form and substance also highlights the choices and constraints that governments face, both in negotiating international agreements and in deciding to comply with them over time. As a preliminary example, consider a country that advocates the adoption of a “deep” multilateral agreement that requires major changes in existing behaviour. The State can pursue various strategies to achieve its objective. It may limit participation to a smaller number of countries with similar preferences that will accept the onerous requirements of the treaty. Or it can broaden participation by offering incentives or concessions to countries reluctant to ratify the agreement. These incentives can take many forms, such as ancillary payments, technical assistance, and other benefits of joining a contract. However, they may also include flexibility mechanisms that make the treaty more attractive by empowering parties to manage the risks associated with joining the agreement. These provisions act as insurance policies. They provide protection against uncertainty that allows a State to revise, readjust or even abandon its obligations if the expected benefits of contractual cooperation prove to be exaggerated (Images 1981; Sykes, 1991; Helfer, 2005). Conflict of law rules, choice of law, jurisdiction, predictability, values, virtues, discretion, rules and norms, approaches, uniformity, territoriality, policy analysis, traditional theories versus modern theories, first reprocessing, second reprocessing, third reprocessing, European approach, false dichotomies Available at: scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2452 need for flexibility in international agreements. Nature 132, 816 (1933).

doi.org/10.1038/132816c0 Private International Law: Current Challenges and Ongoing Relevance Civil Procedure Law Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Litigation Commons, Policy Making, Analysis and Evaluation Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Public Policy Commons. Contracts, international cooperation, international obligations Certainty or flexibility in conflicts of laws Sign up for the nature newsletter – what matters in science, every day for free in your inbox. Roosevelt, Kermit III, “Certainty vs. Flexibility in Conflict of Laws” (2019). Scholarship to Penn Carey Law. 2029. scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2029 Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements, in International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A.

Pollack eds., Cambridge University Press, 2012) By submitting a comment, you agree to abide by our Terms of Service and Community Guidelines. If you find something abusive or does not comply with our terms or policies, please mark it as inappropriate.