Criticism is also the study, evaluation and interpretation of literature, works of art, films and social trends (see article links below). The aim is to understand the possible meanings of cultural phenomena and the context in which they take shape. It is often assessed how cultural productions relate to other cultural productions and what place they occupy in a particular cultural genre or tradition. From the 1970s, under the influence of neo-Marxism, critical theory and Michel Foucault in the English-language academic social sciences and humanities, it became fashionable to use the French word “critique” instead of ordinary “criticism”. The suggestion is that there is a difference between the two terms, but what exactly it is is often not entirely clear. Often, the connotation is that if a consultation is a “criticism” and not just a “criticism”, then there is “a lot of extra thought and deep meaning” behind what is being said. A “critique” in the modern sense is generally understood as a systematic criticism, a critical essay, or the critical appraisal of a discourse (or parts of a speech). Thus, many scientific works have been titled or subtitled “a criticism”. Beginning in the 1970s, English-speaking academics and journalists also began to use the word “critical” not only as a noun, but also as a verb (for example, “I criticized the idea,” instead of “I criticized the idea”). What is often implied is that “criticism” penetrates deeper into the subject or is more complete than “criticism”, perhaps because the professional criteria of a particular discipline are applied. Especially educators, but also, for example, lawyers, managers and politicians are very concerned about the quality of criticism.

People can raise all kinds of objections and criticisms, but how good are they? Criticism can only be “noise”. They can also be a nuisance if they are misdirected, they prevent them from accomplishing tasks. However, there is a larger and perhaps more enduring legal gap between the critical jurisprudence of the twentieth century and the new legal critique of the twenty-first century, which even overshadows these methodological and substantial divisions. It largely concerns the relations assumed by the two groups between law, politics and morality. In short, new legal critics adopt various moral principles that are imperfectly articulated even in positive law, as the basis for their legal criticism or as the basis against which their criticism is raised. 12 12 The idea that moral criticism of the law must be based on premises which themselves derive from the law goes back to approaches to the critique of the law and also to certain currents of liberal legalism. For precursors of natural law, see generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Serious (1978); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 18–19 (2011). For more recent examples of this type of overtly moralistic approach to legal criticism, see, for example, Paul Gowder, The Rule of Law in the Real World 7-27 (2016); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights 14 (2014) (arguing that dignity is both a principle of morality and of law); Robin West, Taking Care of Justice (1999); Robin West, Normative Jurisprudence (2011) (argues for a normative approach to legal criticism); Michelle Madden Dempsey, Why We Are (or at least Should Be) Legal, 66 J. Legal Educ. 29, 35 (2016) (Arguing that the law provides for general moral obligations for individuals, whether or not general moral normative forces exist); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 Emory L.J.

815, 817 (2007) (arguing that traditional morality, which regulates gender expression, fosters inequality between men and women and unfairly influences the law); Benjamin C. Zipursky & John C.P. Goldberg, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917, 919 (2010) (Argument that tort law should be understood as a set of laws that provides remedies for injustice). Therefore, according to the new legal criticisms, the law should be criticized on the basis of moral principles and ethical ideals emanating from the law itself. 13 13 See, for example, Dagan & Dorfman, op.

cit. cit., Note 1, p. 1399 (Definition of morality in private law dealing with interpersonal matters). Twentieth-century critical jurists, on the other hand, aggressively avoided moral criticism of the law of any kind, but especially when the moral principles that justified the criticism were supposed to be articulated in the law itself. 14 14 See, for example, Kelman, Critical Legal Studies, loc. cit. 3, p. 42 (with reference to the various critical views on legal theory); Kennedy, Stages of Decline, note 10 above, at 1352 (referring to the elimination of the distinction between public and private). Narrow moral principles and everything that can be said about them, according to critical jurists, simply cannot be the basis for criticism of the law, especially because they can and must be subjected to the same criticism as the law itself: moral principles are incoherent, contradictory, often expressed in the form of moral or human rights, which are then co-opted by dominant economic interests and are fundamentally too protective of property, wealth and claims.

15 15 See, for example, Unger, loc. cit. 3, in 107 (which indicates a fundamental reformulation of social theory). The criticism of the law by critical jurists was therefore not based on the relationship of the law to its own ideals or to any other moral principle, but on the basis of the various power relations of the law. 16 16 In it, critical jurists join Foucault. See generally Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 Critical Inquiry 777 (1982), and for the need for a new study of the economics of power relations. For a full discussion, see Robin West, Critical Legal Studies – The Missing Years, in Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction 177 (2011). Thus, the law could and should be exposed, deconstructed and criticized for critical jurists, not because it lags behind a moral ideal, but because it embodies, legitimizes, renders invisible or promotes various forms of social, economic or legal power. 17 17 See, for example, Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L.

Rev. 769, 769–72 (having regard to the shortcomings of the usual arguments in traditional law and in economic notices); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Studies, dans Left Legalism/Left Critique 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., Duke Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter Kennedy, Critique of Rights] move to a political critique that rights freeze political competition); Catherine A. MacKinnon, No Moral Question, 2 Yale L. & Pol`y Rev. 321, 323 (1984) (provides a feminist critique of pornography law policy).