If a lawyer violates rule 1.5, the following sanctions are generally appropriate: exclusion if the lawyer knowingly breached the rule, for the purpose of obtaining an advantage for himself or herself or another, and if the lawyer`s conduct caused serious or potential harm to a client, the public or the legal system; suspension if the lawyer knowingly broke the rule and caused serious or potential harm; Reprimand if the lawyer has negligently violated the rule and caused a violation or potential harm; and, as a warning, whether the lawyer`s conduct was an isolated case of negligence that caused little or no actual or potential harm. See Standards. For the imposition of sanctions for lawyers 7.0-7.4 (Am. Bar Ass`n 1992). In most cases, dismissal is the appropriate sanction for breach of an obligation owed to the legal profession. See id. std. 7.3 cmt. Nevertheless, in Louisiana, the penalty for imposing excessive fees ranges from reprimand to exclusion.

See In re Bailey, 115 Sun.3d 458 (La. 2013); As for Ford, 30 Sun.3d 742 (La. 2010); In re Booth, 6 Sun.3d 158 (La. 2009); In re Petal, 972 Sun. 2d 1138 (La. 2008); In re Levingston, 755 So. 2d 874, 876 n.6 (La. 2000) (cited In re Juakali, 699 Sun. 2d 361 (La.

1997); In re Little, No. 95-DB-009, Schlupf op., p. 3 (La. 1996); In re Watkins, 656 Sun. 2d 984 (La. 1995); In re Quaid, 646 Sun. 2d 343 (La. 1994). Specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court imposed a permanent exclusion of an attorney for multiple violations of Rule 1.5(f)(5), noting that the attorney`s failure to reimburse unearned fees to 39 clients “essentially” converted the fees into the attorney`s personal use. In re Fleming, 970 So.

2d 970 (La. 2007) (with the statement that the lawyer “used a lawyer`s license as a pretext to steal money from the citizens of this state”); see also In re Burkart, 2018 WL 5816846 (La. 2018) (exclusion of lawyers for, among other things, non-reimbursement of undeserved fees to clients and intentional circumvention of clients by ignoring telephone calls); In re Toaston, 225 Sun.3d 1066 (La. 2017) (stating that “permanent exclusion was an appropriate sanction for many cases of lawyer misconduct”, including several violations of Rule 1.5); In re Mitchell, 145 Sun.3d 305 (La. 2014) (imposition of a permanent exclusion on counsel for hundreds of unsubstantiated claims over a period of several years); In re Avery, 110 Sun.3d 563 (La. 2013) (among other things, for the writing of personal cheques drawn on the client`s escrow account and the non-reimbursement of unearned expenses); With respect to Bates, 33 So.3d 162 (s. 2010) (imposition of a permanent exclusion on the lawyer for accepting more than $51,000 in fees and not performing substantial work or reimbursing the funds); In re Lester, 31 Sun.3d 333 (La. 2010) (exclusion of lawyers for multiple violations of Rule 1.5, among several other violations of the rules); and In re Gomez, 29 So.3d 473 (La. 2010) (Attorney`s blocking for non-reimbursement of unpaid fees, failure to immediately transfer funds to a third-party medical provider, and use of client funds for unauthorized purposes). Compliance with Rule 2-200 is not delegable and non-compliance prohibits referral or cost-sharing. In both cases, the apportionment of fees is subject to the requirements of Rule 2-200 of the Code of Ethics, which excludes the apportionment of attorneys` fees among lawyers who are not affiliated with a partnership or law firm, unless: “(1) the client has agreed in writing after a full written declaration has been made that an apportionment of the fees and the terms of such apportionment will be done; and (2) The total amount of fees charged by all lawyers is not increased solely on the basis of the provision on the apportionment of fees and is not unscrupulous, since this term is defined in Rule 4-200. (f) The following rules apply to the payment of fees prior to the provision of services: Third, paragraph (e)(3) requires every lawyer to provide “significant legal services to the client in the matter”. The LSBA proposed this departure from the model rule to curb the abuses that accompany the “mediation of cases” of some lawyers.

That said, the rule is meant to protect clients from lawyers who simply “close” clients, refer cases to lawyers for a share of the fees, and then disappear until it`s time to collect that share. Because of this perceived problem, this rule requires that any lawyer attempting to share fees must not only “represent” the client in the case, but also play a “meaningful” role. Note that the work can potentially be “meaningful,” even if it doesn`t take time or involves only customer relations activities. Since the paying attorney`s professional liability to the client continues, fee contracts under Rule 1.5(e) are subject to the conflict-of-laws rules set out in Rule 1.7. In the event of a conflict under Rule 1.7, the requesting counsel may accept the fees and continue to assume the client`s responsibility in the submitted case only if the following conditions of Rule 1.7(b) are met: Dukes v Matheny, 878 So. 2d 517 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.

2004); see also Chimneywood Homeowners Ass`n, Inc. v. Eagan Ins. Agency, Inc., 57 So.3d 1142, 1152-53 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2011) (dispersal fees “based on the respective services and contributions of counsel for the work performed and other relevant factors”); Bertucci v McIntire, 693 So. 2d 7, 9 (La. Ct.

App. 5th Cir. 1997) (distribution of fees in quantum manga if a sharing agreement has been concluded in violation of the rules of ethics); See also; Huskinson & Brown, LLP v. Wolf, 84 p.3d 379, 385 (Cal. 2004) (with the observation that non-compliance with ethical rules invalidates companies` agreements on the allocation of fees, but does not prohibit an action in quantum law). However, at least one Louisiana appeals court has refused to consider even the merits of a lawsuit that a lawyer who breaks the rules can be subject to fee forfeiture. See Brown v. Seimers, 726 Sun. 2d 1018, 1020 (La.

Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999) (“This complaint. should be elevated to the Bar Association”). Scheffler v Adams & Reese, LLP, 950 Sun. 2d 641, 653 (La. 2007). While an unethical fee-splitting agreement between lawyers may discipline them, it is less clear whether the unethical nature of the agreement will prevent its enforcement between the parties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a fee-splitting agreement is unenforceable if the agreement violates the applicable code of ethics.

See Chaplain v. Pavalon & Gifford, 12 F.3d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1993); see also In re Estate of Katchatag, 907 pp.2d 458, 464-65 (Alaska 1995) (according to Kaplan); see also Lemond v. Jamail, 763 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. App. 1988) (concluding that the cost-sharing agreement is void because it is contrary to public policy). But see King v. Housel, 556 N.E.2d 501, 504-05 (Ohio 1990) (counsel ceased to claim that the fee-splitting agreement was invalid); see Grasso v. Galanter, 2013 WL 5537289, at *3 (D. Nev. 20 September 2013) (equal).

See generally Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers, Contracts is Different, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 443, 447-48 (1998) (arguing that, under the overhaul of the law governing lawyers, the courts have “complete discretion” as to whether a lawyer is entitled to compensation despite a violation of disciplinary rules). On Tuesday, the ABA`s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility released Official Notice 487, which deals with fee-splitting agreements when a lawyer from a separate law firm replaces the first lawyer instead of working together on a contingency fee case.